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SOME PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACT
AS PROMISE
Randy E. Barnett t
INTRODUCTION
CONTRACT AS PROMISE

Despite the fond hopes of generations of legal scholars and activists, freely negotiated and enforceable contracts still govern the
bulk of commercial relations in this country-particularly large complex commercial relations as opposed to consumer transactions.
Law professors have to search pretty hard to find appellate cases
that can be touted as harbingers of a contract-free future.
I want to begin this presentation by acknowledging the important role that Allan Farnsworth has played in keeping contract alive.
Professor Farnsworth is without doubt the preeminent living American contracts authority. His principal contributions include the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"),1 for which he was
the reporter, and his masterful treatise on contracts. 2 These two
projects testify to the fact that one person can make a difference in
the development of law; they have been the doctrinal glue holding
the rules and principles of modem contract law together against a
siege of anti-contract ideology coming from academia. Additionally,
I would be unfair to Allan were I to neglect his theoretically insightful law review articles, particularly those concerning contrac3
tual interpretation.
If the goal of this symposium was to hear from two contract law
professors with diametrically opposing views, then I am afraid that
the organizers erred in inviting Professor Farnsworth and myself.
This is not to say, however, that I have no disagreements with Professor Farnsworth. I do. In this essay, I shall try to explain why,
although contract thankfully still lives in practice, the prevailing theory of contract that has been promoted by Professor Farnsworth
and others is deficient in that it leaves contract law vulnerable to
t
Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
2 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (1990).
3 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and PreliminaryAgreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); E. Allan Farnsworth,
"Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE LJ. 939 (1967).
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being undermined in the ways that, for example, Walter Olson de4
scribes in his contribution to this symposium.
In particular, mainstream contract theory is dominated by the
conception of "contract as promise," or what I shall call the promise
theory of contracts. From the Second Restatement to Contract as
Promise5 by Charles Fried, it is widely assumed that the basis of enforcing contracts is related to the obligation one has to keep one's
promises. 6 According to this theory, one looks to the institution of
promising to see why, and therefore when, commitments should be
legally enforceable. This is hardly a new development. The promise theory of contract achieved preeminence through the efforts of
Harvard Law School Professor Samuel Williston in his famous trea8
tise 7 and in the first Restatement of Contracts ("First Restatement").
(You might say that Professor Williston was the Allan Farnsworth of
his day.)
Now I realize that to many the promise theory may seem not
only to be obviously correct, but one cannot immediately imagine
an acceptable alternative to it. Certainly, it seems preferable to the
detrimental reliance theory of contract promoted by those heralding
the "Death of Contract." 9 And I freely admit that the promise theory has its attractions-particularly if one assesses, as I do, the vitality of contract by the extent to which a legal system implements the
classical liberal conception of justice, 0 a central principle of which
is freedom of contract. Freedom of contract has two distinct dimensions: The first-freedom from contract-stipulates that persons
should not have contractual obligations imposed on them without
their consent. The second-freedom to contract-stipulates that
4
See Walter Olson, Tortification of Contract Law: Displacing Consent and Agreement, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1043 (1992).
5

See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-

TION (1981).
6 This does not mean that a promise theory is necessarily a "will theory" which
bases contractual obligation on the promisor's subjective will to be bound. Promises
may also be thought to create obligation because other persons have or are likely to rely
upon them to their detriment. For a discussion of the various theories that have been
advanced to justify contractual obligation, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986) (critically evaluating will, reliance, efficiency,
fairness, and bargain theories of contractual obligation).
7
SAMUEL W. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (lst ed. 1920).
8

8 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1928). Williston was the Reporter for the First

Restatement.
9

See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). For a discussion of some

of the difficulties with this theory, see Barnett, supra note 6, at 274-77; Randy E. Barnett
& Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissoy Estoppel, ContractFormalities,and Misrepresentations, 15 HoFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987).
10 I discuss the social function of the liberal conception ofjustice in Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 62
(1992).
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persons should have the power to alter by consent their legal relations.1 The promise theory has been salutary to both aspects of
freedom of contract to some degree.
The promise theory views the origin of contract in the making
of a promise.1 2 This means that it views the creation of contracts as
arising, in an important part, from the voluntary acts of promisors
rather than from third parties like the State. In this regard, the theory facilitates the classical liberal value of freedom to contract. The
promise theory also supports the notion that contracts should be
interpreted according to the terms of the promise rather than by
imposing terms on the parties. In this regard, the theory facilitates
the classical liberal value of freedom from contract. These strengths
of the promise theory are why I credit Professor Farnsworth-one of
the leading proponents of this theory of contract-with helping to
keep contract alive. By promoting the promise theory so effectively,
he has helped bolster both freedom from and freedom to contract.
Yet the promise theory is not without its difficulties, though
these difficulties are complex and hard to explain concisely. With
this caveat in mind, however, and at the risk of substantial oversimplification, I shall attempt to summarize some of the problems that
arise from adhering to a promise theory of contract.
I
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE PROMISE THEORY OF
CONTRACT

Serious problems with the promise theory begin the moment
we seek a rationale for enforcing promises. The problem for which
the promise theory is supposed to be the solution is to figure out
exactly why it is that contracts are legally enforceable (and, therefore, which commitments should be enforced). That is, we are concerned, not with why persons ought to keep their word, but with
why and therefore when coercion may be used by third parties, including the State, to compel promisors either to perform or pay
damages when they fail to keep their word. The best-known answers to the question of legal enforceability provided by the promise theory are often either highly moralistic or tort-like in nature.
11 For a discussion of these principles and the important social functions they perform, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821 (1992).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise
or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 11, at 4
("[T]he law of contracts is confined to promises.") (emphasis added).
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Professor Fried, for example, has argued that the obligation to
keep one's promises is a moral one:
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he
has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give
grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised
performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to
invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that
confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared
social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.13
But a moral theory of promising, standing alone, would have
courts enforcing purely moral commitments, which is tantamount to
legislating virtue. Such an open-ended rationale leads to serious
problems for the value of freedom of contract. First, it commits
courts to enforcing promissory commitments that the parties themselves may never have contemplated as "contractual" or legally enforceable, thereby undermining the value of freedom from contract.
Second, once the moral behavior of the promissor is deemed relevant to the issue of enforceability, the promise theory also appears
to make relevant to the issue of enforcement other moral aspects of
the promisor's behavior that may argue against enforcement,
thereby undermining the value of freedom to contract. In this manner, the common-law rights of contract can come to resemble the
judicial discretion of a court of equity.
Another popular justification of the promise theory looks at the
promise from the direction of the promisee. That is, persons may
be compelled to perform or pay damages because others have relied
or are likely to rely upon a promise to their detriment. t4 This was
the rationale for contract law apparently favored by Fuller and Perdue in their famous article The Reliance Interest in ContractDamagesi5__
although, as evidenced by his later article, Considerationand Form, 16
Lon Fuller himself never took an injurious reliance theory as far as
the many subsequent law professors who so admire his earlier pathbreaking work. When the enforceability of promises is justified in
this way the promise theory is but a short step away from a detrimental reliance theory. That is, once the injury suffered by the
promisee is made the principal rationale for enforcing promises, we
FRIED, supra note 5, at 16 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicialMethod, 97 Ht-Rv. L. REV.
678 (1984);Jay M. Feinman, The Meaningof Reliance: A HistoricalPerspective, 1984 Wis. L.
13

14

REV. 1373.
15 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, 46

L.J. 373 (1936-1937).
Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). In this article, Fuller makes clear that he considers private autonomy to be a vital part of any complete account of contractual obligation.
YALE
16

1026

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1022

end up with the following very tort-like theory of contract: Just as
tort actions compensate persons injured by physical conduct, contract actions compensate persons injured by verbal promissory conduct. In such an approach, either dimension of freedom of contract
plays little, if any, role. In sum, this way of justifying the promise
theory ultimately transforms it into the detrimental reliance theory,
which undermines rather than supports contract as a distinct type of
consensual obligation within the liberal conception ofjustice.
Even the efficiency rationale for the promise theory provided by
law-and-economics scholars creates problems. According to this
view, an exchange of promises (bargains) is enforceable because
both parties are made better off ex ante.17 Sole reliance on this rationale creates two problems. First, it apparently permits promises
to go unenforced whenever it can be shown that factors such as unequal bargaining power or disparities of information undermine the
normal assumption of mutual ex ante gain.1 8 Second, it enables
some to ask why the efficacy of contracts should be assessed according to the ex ante benefits rather than some assessment of ex post fairness of the exchange. Why is the perspective of the parties before
the exchange occurs the most appropriate point in a transaction to
assess whether someone is made better or worse off by an
exchange?
Yet another serious problem for freedom of contract is created
by the promise theory's exclusive focus on promises once it is conceded, as it must be, that many real-world contract law problems
arise precisely because parties have unavoidably left "gaps" in their
promises. Some theorists argue that other nonpromissory principles must be used to determine the "gap-filling" rules of contract
law. 1 9 According to Charles Fried, who takes exactly this position,
where gaps exist in a contract, "the court is forced to sort out the
difficulties that result when parties think they have agreed but actually have not. The one basis on which these cases cannot be resolved is on the basis of the agreement-that is, of contract as
promise." 20 While Fried, perhaps reluctantly, concedes this point,
other theorists who are quite hostile to viewing consent as central to
17
Of course, the law-and-economics analysis of contract is considerably richer and
more complex than this simple proposition. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 79-123 (3d ed. 1986).
18 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The BargainPrincipleand Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV.
741, 750 (1982) ("The argument based on the efficiency of contract price is fully effective only to the extent that the relevant market does not materially differ from a perfectly
competitive market. In fact, however, many contracts are made in markets that are
highly imperfect.").
19 See Barnett, supra note 11.
20
FRIED, supra note 5, at 60.
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contract law-such as relational theorists Ian Macneil 21 and Peter
Linzer 22-exalt in this view.
Perhaps more surprisingly, some law-and-economics scholars
have adopted the same argument. 23 Because the problem of promissory gaps is pervasive, the promise theory implicitly legitimizes a
variety of gap-filling rules based not on the parties' explicit or implicit consent, but on any policy or principle a court or legislature
may happen to prefer. As Richard Craswell has argued, "[d]ebates
over the question of why promises are binding ... do much less
than is commonly supposed to settle the role to be played by efficiency, non-economic values, or ethical theories generally in select24
ing contract law's background rules."
II
SOME ADVANTAGES OF A CONSENT THEORY OF CONTRACT

What alternative is there to the promise theory that can capture
its advantages while avoiding its drawbacks? I favor an updated version of the older view of contract that seeks to distinguish between
enforceable and unenforceable promises by looking to see if the
parties to an agreement manifested their intention to create or alter
their legal relations. According to this approach, the factor that
must accompany a promise and that justifies substantial reliance
upon a promise is the existence of a manifested intention to create legal
relations or, to use another common formulation, a manifested intention
25
to be legally bound.
I have called this the consent theory of contract. 26 According to
a consent theory (and here I simplify the theory considerably),
21

See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contractsand Presentation, 60 VA. L.

REv. 589, 593 (1974) ("When the guise of... consensually formed law was not possible,
...the system filled the gaps by supplying presentation in the form of predictable and
theoretically precise rules."). For a more extensive presentation of Macneil's views of
consent and my critique, see Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming August 1992).
22 See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139; Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract?-Replyingto Four
Critics, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 213.
23 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
24 Id. at 528. For my reply to Craswell, see Barnett, supra note 11 at 874-97.
25 Although these two formulations are adequate for most purposes, for reasons

that are beyond the scope of this essay, they are not completely accurate. A more complete expression of the principle would be that contractual obligation arises when a
person "voluntarily performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable rights." Barnett, supra note 6, at 300.
26 In addition to the articles already cited, see Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining
Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1992) Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External
Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undis-
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promises and other types of commitments ought to be legally enforceable if they are made in such a way as to convey to a promisee
the message that the promisor intends to be held legally accountable for nonperformance. This message can be conveyed formallyfor example, by a signed waiver of tort liability that is written in a
manner that is intelligible to the person signing it.27 Or it can be
conveyed informally, as done on every commodities exchange in the
world. 28 Regardless of how this message is conveyed, without it a
29
promise does not create an enforceable contractual obligation.
With this message, a promise is presumptively enforceable as a
30
contract.
For example, when I promised Janice Calabresi that I would
take part in this symposium, I certainly did not intend to subject
myself to legal sanctions should I for some reason fail to participate.
Nor do I think that, while she certainly relied on my promise, Janice
could reasonably have believed that I had consented to assume any
contractual obligation to appear. Although she may have judged me
harshly for withdrawing as a participant, both she and I would consider it to be the height of injustice if I were to be sued for breach of
contract. Something more formal or more explicit than our phone
conversation would have had to occur to rebut the normal presumption that a promise to speak is not legally binding on the speaker,
although I have no doubt that there is a court somewhere that
would disagree.
If the promise theorym-whether based on the moral rationale of
promise-keeping, on the rationale of injurious reliance, or on some
other rationale-is the predominant view of the twentieth century,
the consent theory, whose roots go back centuries, was probably the
predominant contract theory of the nineteenth century (although it
is a bit difficult to be sure about this since so much of legal theory in
that period was implicit rather than explicit). The view that Williston needed to argue against and which he and others eventually defeated when they succeeded in making promise-keeping the focal
closed Agency With Contract Theory, CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1988); Randy E. Barnett, Contract
Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HAIv. L. REv. 1223 (1984). A

condensed and revised account of this approach appears in Randy E. Barnett, Rights and
Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract, in LIABILrrY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND MORALS 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Morris eds., 1991).
27 See Barnett, supra note 6, at 310-12.
28 See id. at 312-17. See also Barnett & Becker, supra note 9.
29 However, such conduct could still give rise to legal liability sounding in tort or
restitution, provided the requirements of these types of liability are present.
30 Because consent is only presumptively binding, other circumstances such as duress, fraud, and incapacitation, if established, could rebut the presumption and defeat a
claim for contractual enforcement. See Barnett, supra note 6, at 309-10, 318-19.
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point of contract theory, was stated by Professor Ernest Lorenzen in
1919: "Agreements which are physically possible and legally permissible should, on principle, be enforceable.., if it was the intention of the parties to assume legal relations." 3 1 Williston's triumph
over this view was reflected in section 20 of the First Restatement
which stated that: "neither... the mental assent to the promises in
the contract nor real or apparentintention that the promises shall be legally
binding is essential [to contract formation]." 3 2 This position was
adopted in section 21 of the Second Restatement, which states that
"neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract. ....
.,3

By arguing, as I have in my writings on contract, that consenta manifested intention to be legally bound-is the key to distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable promises, I do not mean
to suggest that courts should simply look for this intention unguided by general rules and principles. I suspect that a direct pursuit of these intentions on a case-by-case basis would likely lead to
more injustice from the standpoint of consent than it would avoid.
To the contrary, the bargain requirement of consideration that plays
a pivotal role in both the First and Second Restatements, and which
states that mutually inducing promises are presumptively enforceable, is an excellent, though far from perfect,3 4 criterion of consensual obligation precisely because the existence of a bargain so
frequently corresponds to the existence of a manifested intention to
be legally bound. This means that, in practice, there is often very
little difference between a promise theory as embodied in the Restatement and a consent theory.
Still, an exclusive focus on either bargained-for consideration
or detrimental reliance, or both, as criteria of contractual obligation
creates serious problems of underenforcement and overenforcement. By this I mean a failure to enforce consensual commitments
that should be enforced and the enforcement of commitments to
which the parties did not consent and therefore should not be enforced. The problem of underenforcement is the concern of those
contributors to this symposium, such as Walter Olson, 35 who complain that consensual commitments to waive tort liability and to as31 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE LJ.
621, 646 (1919).

32

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1928) (emphasis added).

33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). This proposition is qualified
somewhat, however, by the further stipulation that "a manifestation of intention that a
promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract." Id.
(emphasis added). This may represent a subtle shift in the direction of consent theory.
34 See Barnett, supra note 6, at 287-91; Barnett & Becker, supra note 9.
35 See Olson, supra note 4.
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sume greater than normal risks of harm are held to be
unenforceable no matter how demonstrable or knowledgeable may
be the exercise of consent by a person assuming such a risk. In this
manner, the ability of persons to exercise freedom to contract and
avoid the hazards of the tort-law system of negligence is undermined, as Peter Huber and Walter Olson have so graphically de36
scribed in their writings.
Consider for a moment the more neglected problem of the
overenforcement of promises. One famous example of overenforcement engendered, at least in part, by the promise theory of
contract, is the case of Texaco v. Pennzoil.s 7 Texaco was accused of
having tortiously interfered with a contract that allegedly existed between the Getty Foundation and Pennzoil. Texaco argued, in part,
that there was no contract between Getty and Pennzoil for it to interfere with. So, an important issue in the case was whether or not a
contract existed between Getty and Pennzoil.
The Texas Court of Appeals took the view that whether a contract existed or not depended on whether the parties "intended to
be bound" 8s to the agreement they had apparently reached.
Although this formulation sounds like a consent theory standard of
"manifested intention to be legally bound," it could simply be another way of saying that one has made a promise. According to the
Second Restatement, "[a] promise is a manifestation of intention to act
or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
39
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."
While I have no quarrel with this definition of a promise, it implies that everyone who makes a promise is "binding" themselves in
some significant sense. Surely, I "bound" myself to come to Washington to give this presentation insofar as I gave Janice Calabresi
reason to believe that I had made a "commitment" to attend, even
though (in my opinion at least) I did not manifest an intention to be
legally bound. Although they never squarely address the matter in
Texaco v. Pennzoil, the Texas trial and appellate courts appear to have
viewed the crucial issue to be whether or not a promise had been
made. They concluded that sufficient evidence of a promise existed
to justify the jury's verdict. If, however, any promise that was made
by Getty to Pennzoil was not apparently intended to be legally bind36 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION ExPLOsION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr (1991).
37 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App. 1987).
38 Id. at 789 ("The issue of when the parties intended to be bound is a fact question
to be decided from the parties' acts and communications.").
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
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ing, then from the perspective of the liberal principle of freedom
from contract, this case is an instance of overenforcement.
Another recent case provides an intriguing example of a court
attempting to use something like a consent theory of contract,
rather than a promise theory, to decide whether a promise should
be enforced and to prevent overenforcement. This is the Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. 40 case, which has become well-known (and was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States) 4 1 because the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that enforcing a promise of confidentiality of a reporter to her source violated the First Amendment.
For present purposes, the more interesting issue in the case is the
contract law issue entirely avoided by the United States Supreme
Court but considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court. This is the
question of whether the promise of confidentiality made by a newspaper reporter to a source was properly enforceable according to
contract law rather than according to the First Amendment. The
majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by
observing:
A contract, it is said, consists of an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration. Here, we seemingly have all three, plus a breach.
We think, however, the matter is not this simple.
Unquestionably, the promises given in this case were intended by the promisors to be kept....
The question before us, however, is not whether keeping a
confidential promise is ethically required but whether it is legally
enforceable; whether, in other words, the law should superimpose
a legal obligation on a moral and ethical
obligation. The two obli42
gations are not always coextensive.
After noting that "in this case.., we have a clear-cut promthe Minnesota Supreme Court went on to offer a consent theory rationale for nonenforcement:

ise,"' 43

The law ... does not create a contract where the parties intended none .... Nor does the law consider binding every ex-

change of promises.... We are not persuaded that in the special
milieu of media newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily
believe that they are engaged in making a legally binding contract.
They are not thinking in terms of offers and acceptances in any
commercial or business sense. The parties understand that the

40
41
42
43

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990).
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
457 N.W.2d at 202-03.
Id. at 203.
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reporter's promise of anonymity is given as a moral commitment,
but a moral obligation alone will not support a contract .... 44
The court then concluded:
In other words, contract law seems here an ill fit for a promise
of news source confidentiality. To impose a contract theory on
this arrangement puts an unwarranted legal rigidity on a special
ethical relationship, precluding necessary consideration of factors
underlying that ethical relationship. We conclude that a contract cause of action is inappropriate for these particular
45
circumstances.
Of course, one can disagree about whether, on the facts of the
case, the parties had or had not actually manifested an intention to
be legally bound. But, the dissenters focused their fire not on the
evidence of intent to be bound, but instead on the majority's implicit rejection of the promise theory, which maintains that the issue
of intent to create contractual relations is irrelevant to contract formation. Justice Yetka argued:
The simple truth of the matter is that the appellants made a promise of confidentiality to Cohen in consideration for information
they considered newsworthy. That promise was broken and, as a
direct consequence, Cohen lost his job. Under established rules
of contract law, the appellants should be responsible for the con46
sequences of that broken promise.
Justice Kelly, in dissent, explicitly advocated the promise theory:
I remain unpersuaded by the majority's analysis that, notwithstanding that all the elements of a legal contract and its breach are
here present, the contract is unenforceable because "the parties
intended none." It reaches this conclusion even as it concedes
that the promises given by the agents and employees of these de47
fendants was [sic] intended by them to be kept.

In sum; both dissenting opinions accepted the conventional approach that a promise is actionable whether or not it is accompanied
by a manifested intention to be legally bound. Their passionate dissents on this issue support my interpretation that the majority had
in its opinion implicitly rejected the promise theory and, perhaps
unwittingly, embraced a consent theory.
44

Id. Notice how this language rejects the moral theory of "contract as promise"

offered by Charles Fried.
45
46

Id.

Id at 205. Notice that Justice Yetka's language implicitly relies on the injurious
reliance rationale for enforcing promises.
47 Id. at 206. Of course, had the promisors not intended to keep the promise at the
time they made it, the legal theory would have been fraud, not breach of contract. See
Barnett & Becker, supra note 9, at 485-95.
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Ultimately, however, the majority made the telling theoretical
mistake of considering the plaintiff's promissory estoppel argument
as wholly unrelated to the issue of intent to contract.4 8 By holding
that the First Amendment, rather than the lack of contractual consent, barred a promissory estoppel cause of action, the stage was set
for the Supreme Court reversal that eventually occurred.
CONCLUSION

Those who are interested in maintaining the life of contract
should take an interest in the theories of contract that are discussed
in the law schools. It is not enough to lambast the courts for reaching results that one intuitively finds absurd. One must also burrow
beneath the results to find the flaw in the theory or doctrine that
produced the outcome. For, until we discover the theoretical or
doctrinal error, we can never be completely sure that it is the result
rather than our intuitions that are mistaken.
The promise theory has been accepted for decades because it
comports with some of our most basic intuitions about contractual
obligations. Unfortunately, where it deviates from these intuitions,
the promise theory has led to results and doctrines that have undermined the centrality of consent in contract law and theory. A consent theory of contract preserves much of what is intuitively
appealing about the promise theory while incorporating many of the
results and doctrines upon which opponents of consent have based
their theories. In this way, a consent theory of contract transcends
the limitations of the promise theory, and thereby helps to preserve
the twin liberal values of freedom from and freedom to contract.

48
For an analysis of promissory estoppel from the perspective of contractual consent, see Barnett, supra note 6; Barnett & Becker, supra note 9.

